Screening sources
The lists the engine screens against, the version of each one on disk right now, and — at the bottom — what they do not cover. Generated from the registry the code reads, so it cannot describe a list we stopped downloading.
The subprocessor page makes the strongest claim on this site: no name is sent to a screening vendor, because there is no screening vendor. The lists are downloaded from the authorities that maintain them and matched in this process.
That claim is worth exactly as much as the lists behind it, and “which version of which list, on what date” is the first question in an audit. So the answer is here, in public, rather than only in the screening record we hand you.
What is on disk
US Consolidated Screening List — BIS Entity List, Denied Persons, OFAC SDN, State Dept not fetched us-csl
- PUBLISHER
- International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce
- GIVES EFFECT TO
- EAR 15 CFR 744 Supp. 4 and Supp. 2; 31 CFR (OFAC); ITAR 22 CFR 126.7
- ENTRIES
- not parsed in this process — the count is not guessed
- FETCHED
- never
- SHA-256
- no file to hash
- SIZE
- —
EU consolidated financial sanctions list not fetched eu-fsf
- PUBLISHER
- European Commission, DG FISMA — Financial Sanctions Database
- GIVES EFFECT TO
- asset freezes under Council Regulation (EU) 269/2014 and the other CFSP regimes
- ENTRIES
- not parsed in this process — the count is not guessed
- FETCHED
- never
- SHA-256
- no file to hash
- SIZE
- —
A copy older than 24 hours is refetched before the next screening run. If the refresh fails, the engine screens against the cached copy rather than against nothing — and the record says so, as a warning attached to the outcome. A qualified answer is useful; a silently old one is not.
Every screening record carries the list id, the fetch date and the SHA-256 of each file it was decided against, so a certificate issued last month can be replayed against the bytes that produced it.
Destination control
Restricted-party lists answer who. Where the goods may go is a separate question, decided by a dated snapshot held in the source rather than by a live feed — and it carries its own review date so that it cannot answer confidently long after it stopped being true.
- VERSION
- 2026-08-26.1
- REVIEWED
- 2026-08-26 — 0 day(s) ago within the review window
- WINDOW
- 90 days, after which every order screened under it carries a staleness warning
- ENTRIES
- 6 embargoed destinations, 5 embargoed territories, 23 requiring a person to look
Each entry names the instrument it rests on, because an entry with no citation is an opinion. It is not a licence determination and must never be read as one: classifying an item and deciding whether a licence is required is the exporter’s responsibility, exercised by a person.
What the destination snapshot does not know
- a snapshot maintained by hand, not a live regulatory feed — measures change between reviews
- no licence determination: whether a licence is required, and whether one is held, is the exporter’s
- no de minimis and no foreign-direct-product analysis — both turn on the item, not the destination
- transit and re-export routes are not modelled; only the stated ship-to and ultimate destination
- not yet reviewed by counsel: every entry cites its instrument so that a reviewer can check it
What these lists do not cover
A screener that returns NO_MATCH is making a claim about its own scope whether it admits it or not. These are the measures that escape the two files above, with the shape of each one named so you can judge whether it matters to your trade lane.
- transaction bans are not designations: the EU file carries asset freezes under Regulation (EU) 269/2014, while the prohibition on dealing with e.g. the credit institutions, crypto platforms, oil traders, ports and airports added by the 21st package sits in the annexes to Regulation (EU) 833/2014. A counterparty can be absent from both files above and still be one an EU operator may not transact with
- no Chinese measures: neither MOFCOM’s export control list nor the unreliable entity list is read here. Since those prohibit foreign parties from re-transferring Chinese-origin dual-use items, they bind an EU distributor directly, and an EU/China cross-listing can leave one caught in both directions at once
- no vessels: the 673 tankers designated under the EU shadow-fleet measures are identified by IMO number, and nothing here matches on a vessel
- no effective dates: an entry is read as in force on the day it appears in the file. A measure adopted with deferred effect — the Georgian refinery transaction ban of 23 July 2026 begins six months later — is therefore reported wrong for as long as the deferral lasts, in whichever direction
- no politically exposed persons and no adverse media: commercial data products, belonging to the anti-money-laundering side rather than the export-control side, and bought behind a second adapter on the same port
This page deliberately does not reproduce the lists. A copy of the designations served from our domain would be a mirror of OFAC and the European Commission that is always some hours behind them — and somebody would eventually read a name off it and act on it.
The authorities publish the entries, and the link beside each list above goes to the file itself. What only we can tell you is which of their files this engine read, and when. That is the part that is here.